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PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION, 
CONGRESS, AND THE CONSTITUTION
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
HE political debate over abortion during the
past 25 years has shifted among various di-
chotomous views of the world: life versus
choice, fetus versus woman, fetus versus baby, con-
stitutional right versus states’ rights, government ver-
sus physician, physician and patient versus state leg-
islature. Hundreds of statutes and almost two dozen
Supreme Court decisions on abortion later, the core
aspects of Roe v. Wade,1 the most controversial health-
related decision by the Court ever, remain substan-
tially the same as they were in 1973. Attempts to
overturn Roe in both the courtroom and the legisla-
ture have failed. Pregnant women still have a consti-
tutional right to abortion. The fetus is still not a per-
son under the Constitution. States still cannot make
abortion a crime (either for the woman or the phy-
sician) before the fetus becomes viable. States still
can outlaw abortion after the fetus becomes viable
only if there is an exception that permits abortion to
protect the life or health of the pregnant woman.
And states still can impose restrictions on abortion
before fetal viability only if those restrictions do not
actually create a substantial obstacle to a pregnant
woman’s obtaining an abortion.
The current political tactic has shifted from the
use of antiabortion rhetoric to change the law con-
cerning abortion to the use of legislative and judicial
forums to change the rhetoric of abortion. The hope
seems to be that more heated rhetoric will help turn
the public and physicians against abortion itself, re-
gardless of its constitutionally protected status. 
ROE  AND CASEY
Twenty-five years ago, in Roe  v. Wade, the Su-
preme Court held that women have a constitutional
right of privacy that is “fundamental” and “broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision . . . to
terminate her pregnancy.”1 Because the right is fun-
damental, the state must demonstrate a “compelling
state interest” in order to restrict it. The Court de-
termined that the state’s interest in the life of the fe-
tus becomes compelling only at the point of “viabil-
ity,” defined as the point at which the fetus can
survive independent of its mother. Moreover, the
state cannot favor the life of the fetus over the life or
health of the pregnant woman.
T
In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that even after a
fetus becomes viable, physicians must be able to use
their “medical judgment for the preservation of the
life or health of the mother.” Roe’s companion case,
Doe v. Bolton, specifically included mental health in
this determination, saying, “The medical judgment
may be exercised in the light of all factors — physi-
cal, emotional, psychological, familial, and the wom-
an’s age — relevant to the well-being of the patient.
All these factors may relate to health. This allows the
attending physician the room he needs to make his
best medical judgment.”2 
When the Court heard Planned Parenthood v.
Casey3 in 1992, most commentators assumed that
there were more than enough votes to overturn Roe.
Instead, three seemingly anti-Roe justices together
wrote a joint opinion confirming the “core holding”
of Roe: that states could not outlaw abortion before
the fetus becomes viable and could do so thereafter
only when the life or health of the woman was not
threatened by continuing the pregnancy.3,4 With the
loss of all hope that the Court would ever overturn
Roe, antiabortion advocates needed a new approach
to keep the abortion debate alive. They found it in
so-called partial-birth abortions.
PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION IN CONGRESS
In June 1995, the first Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act was introduced in Congress to make it a federal
crime to perform “an abortion in which the person
performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a
living fetus before killing the fetus and completing
the delivery.” In March 1996, the House passed a
revised Senate version, which provided in part:
(a) Whoever, in or affecting interstate or foreign com-
merce, knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and
thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
(b) . . . the term partial-birth abortion means an abor-
tion in which the person performing the abortion partially
vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and
completing the delivery . . . . it is an affirmative defense
. . . that the partial-birth abortion was performed by a
physician who reasonably believed (1) the partial-birth
abortion was necessary to save the life of the mother; and
(2) no other procedure would suffice for that purpose.5
In April 1996, President Bill Clinton vetoed the
bill at a White House press conference at which five
women described how they had made the decision
to terminate their pregnancies with what could be
considered a partial-birth abortion under the pro-
posed law. He said that the debate was “not about
the prochoice/prolife debate” but about the tragic
circumstances of “a few hundred Americans every
year who desperately want their children.” The Pres-
ident made it clear that he would sign a bill that
was consistent with Roe v. Wade. In the President’s
words, “I will accept language that says serious, ad-
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verse health consequences to the mother. Those three
words.”6
When the Senate voted in September 1996 to sus-
tain the President’s veto, the leader of the fight to
override it was Senator Rick Santorum (R-Pa.), who
was challenged as having no personal experience or
expertise in this area. A week after the vote, San-
torum had his own story to tell.7 The senator’s wife
had been pregnant with their fourth child when they
were informed that ultrasonography showed that
their child had a “fatal defect,” which turned out to
be complete urinary tract obstruction. They were
given three options: have an abortion, do nothing,
or choose in utero surgery to insert a shunt. They
chose the shunt procedure, which was successfully
performed at 20 weeks’ gestation. The procedure re-
sulted in infection that put Karen Santorum in seri-
ous danger. An abortion would have removed the
source of her infection, but she refused. Instead, she
went into labor and gave birth to an extremely pre-
mature infant, Gabriel. Two hours later he died in
his parents’ arms.
This seemed to give Santorum the personal expe-
rience to make him a more credible antiabortion ad-
vocate. But his experience also illustrates at least two
major problems with the legislation he supports.
First, his wife’s actions can be considered praisewor-
thy only because she had a choice that is protected
by current law. Second, the distinction between pre-
mature delivery and abortion on the edges of viabil-
ity has always been problematic. Santorum, for ex-
ample, has been quoted as having said, in relation to
this experience, that even when the life of the moth-
er is at stake and “you have to end a pregnancy
early . . . that does not necessarily mean having an
abortion. You can induce labor, using a drug like
Pitocin [oxytocin].”8 If one accepts the standard
medical definition of abortion (termination of a
pregnancy when the fetus is not viable), this is a dis-
tinction without a difference. Whether a planned
abortion is performed or labor is induced, both are
intended to terminate a nonviable pregnancy. The
real issue is not the method used to terminate the
pregnancy, but the justification for terminating it. It
is also reasonable to argue that after a fetus is viable,
abortion is simply no longer possible by definition;
the only option is premature delivery.
Moreover, what makes the term “partial-birth abor-
tion” politically powerful is its inaccurate conflation
of two polar-opposite results of pregnancy, birth and
abortion. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.)
has, for example, described it as “as close to infanti-
cide as anything I have come upon.”9 But close is
not identical. When Virginia attorney general Mark
Earley describes the procedure as a “disturbing form
of infanticide,”10 he is making a legally inaccurate
political statement. As the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly held, if the viable fetus is killed for the sake
of the woman’s life or health, the act is not infanti-
cide by definition.1-4 
MEDICAL PRACTICE AND MEDICAL 
POLITICS
In January 1997, Santorum reintroduced the Par-
tial-Birth Abortion Ban Act in the Senate. Approxi-
mately one month later, the executive director of the
National Coalition of Abortion Providers told re-
porters that he had lied in 1995 when he claimed
that partial-birth abortions were rare and were per-
formed only in extreme situations; instead, he said
that “thousands” were performed annually, and most
“on healthy fetuses and healthy mothers.”11 The to-
tal number of abortions performed in the United
States has been steadily declining, although there
seem to be no accurate statistics on the frequency of
partial-birth abortions. There were two important
differences in Congress this time around: medical
organizations took conflicting positions, and sub-
stantial compromises were attempted in the Senate.
The first time around, the American Medical As-
sociation (AMA) had taken no position, and the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG) had urged the President to veto the bill.
In January 1997, ACOG’s executive board issued
its first and only statement on “intact dilatation and
extraction.” The board wrote that it understood that
the bill attempted to outlaw a procedure containing
all of the following four elements:
1. deliberate dilatation of the cervix, usually over a se-
quence of days;
2. instrumental conversion of the fetus to a footing
breech;
3. breech extraction of the body excepting the head; and
4. partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of the liv-
ing fetus to effect vaginal delivery of a dead but other-
wise intact fetus.12
The board described this as “one method of termi-
nating a pregnancy” after 16 weeks. The board not-
ed that it was sometimes used to save the life or
health of the mother, but that its “select panel
. . . could identify no circumstances under which
this procedure . . . would be the only option to
save the life or preserve the health of the woman
. . . [although it] may be the best or most appro-
priate procedure.” The board’s primary point was
that only the woman’s physician should make the de-
cision about what particular procedure to use in in-
dividual circumstances, and that therefore “the in-
tervention of legislative bodies into medical decision
making is inappropriate, ill advised, and danger-
ous.”12
The AMA took a different position. On the eve
of the Senate vote in May 1997, the AMA’s board of
trustees agreed to support the legislation if San-
torum would add two physician-friendly procedural
amendments.13 These were a requirement that the
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physician’s action be “deliberate and intentional,”
and a procedure to involve the state medical board
in the trial of an accused physician. State bans on
partial-birth abortion are based on the inherent po-
lice power that states have to protect the health and
safety of the public. The federal government has no
such power; the federal bill is instead based on the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
Because the AMA endorsed the federal bill, it im-
plicitly agreed that what physicians do with individ-
ual patients in their offices is a matter of interstate
commerce, and therefore subject to regulation by the
federal government. This is a stunning concession.
Attempts to reach a real compromise that could
have resulted in a bill that President Clinton could
sign, and that would probably have been upheld by
the courts as constitutional, were made primarily by
Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), Senator Bar-
bara Boxer (D-Calif.), and Senator Thomas Daschle
(D-S.D.). The Feinstein–Boxer amendment would
have dealt specifically with the problem the Presi-
dent had with the original bill by adding “serious
adverse health consequences to the woman” as an
additional exception to the prohibition. Daschle of-
fered to ban all abortions, by any technique, after vi-
ability. The only exception would be to save the life
of the pregnant woman or to protect her from
“grievous injury” to her physical health, defined as
“a severely debilitating disease or impairment specif-
ically caused by the pregnancy, or an inability to
provide necessary treatment for a life-threatening
condition.”14
Daschle’s bill defined the realm of the debate as
the period after viability (roughly the third trimes-
ter) but nonetheless attempted to limit the reach of
Roe v. Wade by restricting the exception regarding
the health of the pregnant woman to physical (not
mental) health and to the risk of “grievous” harm,
at that. ACOG endorsed the Daschle compromise,
but in doing so seemed to put politics over loyalty
to patients, since the Daschle proposal limited the
ability of a physician to act to protect the health of
a patient after the fetus becomes viable.
In May 1997, the Senate adopted the Santorum
bill by a vote of 64 to 36, and in October 1997, it
was passed by the House and sent to the President.
Two days later, President Clinton again vetoed the
bill. He issued a three-paragraph message to the
House of Representatives, in which he said he was
vetoing the bill “for exactly the same reasons I re-
turned an earlier substantially identical version . . .
last year” — that is, because of its failure to include
an exception for abortion to prevent “serious harm”
to a woman’s health.15
As Daschle’s proposed compromise indicated, by
1997 the debate in Congress had begun to shift
from a focus on partial-birth abortion to a more
general focus on “late-term abortion.” In this con-
text, ACOG issued the following statement in July
1997: “ACOG is opposed to abortion of the healthy
fetus that has attained viability in a healthy woman.
Viability is the capacity of the fetus to survive out-
side the mother’s uterus. Whether or not this capac-
ity exists is a medical determination, may vary with
each pregnancy and is a matter for the judgment of
the responsible attending physician.”16 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF MEDICAL 
PROCEDURES
Both sides admit that even if the technique of in-
tact dilatation and extraction is outlawed, it is un-
likely that even one abortion will be prevented.
Thus, perhaps the primary lesson of the past 25
years is that the controversy over abortion in Amer-
ica is not susceptible to political solution. Moreover,
since neither Congress nor the states can alter the
constitutional law of abortion as set forth in Roe
v. Wade1 and Casey,3 if the debate about partial-
birth abortion were only a debate about abortion it-
self, it would be of little practical consequence. The
debate, however, exposes other important issues.
The chief issue is the proper role of the govern-
ment in regulating medical care. Historically, pro-
choice forces have favored this framing of the abor-
tion debate. When the debate about abortion is
argued as a choice between having a woman and her
physician make the decision and having the state leg-
islature or Congress make it, the woman and her
physician are the overwhelming choice of Ameri-
cans. The government-versus-physician framework is
also uncomfortable for Republicans, who tend to ar-
gue against government interference with private de-
cision making. And even when government regula-
tion seems appropriate, most Republicans prefer
regulation by the states to regulation by the federal
government.
A more focused way to frame the debate is to ask
whether decisions about specific medical procedures
should be made by physicians or the Congress. The
AMA’s support of the ban on partial-birth abortion
seems to be a repudiation of its historic position
against government interference in this realm. If
the AMA believes that the federal government can
outlaw a constitutionally protected procedure per-
formed in the privacy of a physician’s office on the
basis of the federal government’s power to regulate
interstate commerce, then the AMA has conceded
that the federal government can regulate all medical
procedures. On the other hand, the AMA has never
had a consistent position on abortion.17
The issue of who (the medical profession or the
state — or health plans, for that matter) has the au-
thority to determine what is and what is not a legit-
imate medical procedure has implications for every-
thing done by physicians, not just for abortions.18
Roe v. Wade and Casey both teach that government
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restrictions on legitimate medical procedures that
are used to perform abortions before the fetus is vi-
able are unconstitutional (at least if the use of such
procedures does not increase the risks to the wom-
an’s health). These cases also teach that the failure
to make exceptions to outlawed procedures (so that
they can be used to protect the life and health of the
pregnant woman) also makes the bills regulating
partial-birth abortion unconstitutional as passed.
It has been primarily because of the failure to al-
low physicians to protect the woman’s health after
the fetus becomes viable, the vagueness of the defi-
nition of partial-birth abortion, and the application
of the ban before fetal viability that courts have
found that some of the similar laws regulating par-
tial-birth abortion that have been passed in more
than two dozen states are unconstitutional.19-24 Only
in Wisconsin was the state statute not immediately
enjoined, and because of its vagueness and the life-
imprisonment penalty provided for physicians who
performed partial-birth abortions, abortion clinics
in that state shut down for almost a week in the
spring of 1998 until local district attorneys agreed
not to use the statute to prosecute physicians who
performed abortions before 16 weeks.25
In the only case to reach the Supreme Court so
far, in March 1998, the Court refused to hear an ap-
peal of a lower-court decision that the Ohio ban on
partial-birth abortion was unconstitutional. Three
justices (Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, and Wil-
liam Rehnquist), however, voted to hear the appeal
so that the Court could reopen what has become
the central issue in the debate: whether the Consti-
tution requires an exception to a ban on abortion
after viability that includes the pregnant woman’s
mental health.26 Although we can only guess at why
none of the other six justices voted to hear this case
(it takes four justices to agree to hear an appeal to
the Court), it would appear that all of them think
that a woman’s mental health is as protected under
the Constitution as her physical health.
President Clinton is thus on strong constitutional
grounds when he bases his vetoes on the failure of
these bills to allow for a physician’s action to pre-
serve a pregnant woman’s health. He is also on
strong grounds in insisting, like ACOG, that the
proper person to make a judgment about the health
of the woman is the physician (acting, of course, in
partnership with the woman). As the Court put it in
Roe v. Wade, this “decision vindicates the right of
the physician to administer medical treatment ac-
cording to his professional judgment.”1 This means
that if intact dilatation and extraction is a legitimate
medical procedure, it is constitutionally protected
under Roe v. Wade. If, however, it is not such a pro-
cedure, but rather is in the category of nonmedical
interventions, like female genital mutilation27 and
execution by lethal injection, it has (and deserves)
no such protection. Therefore, another way to frame
the debate about abortion is to ask who should have
the authority to determine which procedures are le-
gitimate medical procedures. 
Efforts to reframe the abortion debate always in-
volve a dichotomy that allows us to ignore or mar-
ginalize either women or fetuses by asking us to
avert our attention from abortion itself and concen-
trate on something else. Often, this something else
is the physician and the relation of medicine to gov-
ernment. At other times, it is (appropriately, I think)
the pregnant woman and her life and health. Preg-
nancy is a unique human condition; there is nothing
else like it in medicine or life, and we must therefore
deal with it on its own terms, and not by analogy.
To do so is simply impossible in the political arena.
Because abortion foes have never seemed to care
whether or not the laws they propose are unconsti-
tutional, they have promised to make another at-
tempt to override the Clinton veto if and when they
can muster the three additional votes needed in the
Senate to provide the two-thirds majority needed to
override a presidential veto.28 Otherwise, the issue
will return to the next Congress after the November
election.
Professional organizations should set and follow
the terms of their own specialties, and in this sense
ACOG is the proper body to make this determina-
tion. But when professional organizations determine
the content and scope of reasonable medical practice
not on the basis of their professional skills and the
health interests of their patients, but rather on the
basis of their reading of the prevailing political
winds, they undermine their own credibility and ex-
plicitly agree that standards for medical practice
should be set by politicians rather than by the med-
ical profession.
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